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Much of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative 
policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational 
deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, 
to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases 
where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in 
externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the 
optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the 
optimal externality tax. 
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Both taxes and direct regulation are used to discourage behaviour that gives rise to externalities. For 
example, most European countries levy significant taxes on cigarettes, and these are frequently 
justified in terms of the costs that cigarette smokers impose on others - including the ill-health and 
annoyance caused by passive smoking, and the costs of collectively-financed health care. In parallel, 
many countries have also introduced various forms of direct regulation with similar goals - such as the 
bans on smoking in workplaces and other public spaces introduced in recent years in Norway, Ireland, 
the UK and elsewhere. This paper looks at the economic issues which arise when externality taxes and 
direct regulation are used in parallel. When would the combined use of both instruments be justified - 
in the sense of achieving outcomes which are better than could be achieved using one instrument 
alone? And what are the implications of changes in one instrument for the optimal level at which the 
other should be set? How, for example, does the introduction of an additional legal restriction on 
smoking affect the optimal level of the externality tax on cigarettes? 
 
Most economic analysis of externality taxes and regulation has focussed on the two approaches as 
alternatives. In environmental policy, for example, economists have emphasised the efficiency 
advantages of using “market mechanisms” such as emissions taxes or tradable pollution permits 
compared with the traditional approach of direct “command-and-control” regulations requiring the use 
of particular production or abatement technologies, or setting limits on emissions. Sandmo (2000) 
expressed the conventional view of economists in the following words: “Economists have traditionally 
been sceptical about policy by persuasion, hostile to command and control policies and enthusiastic 
about market based instruments”. Where polluters differ in costs of abatement, the flexibility offered 
by market mechanisms reduces the aggregate cost of achieving a given reduction in emissions 
compared with uniformly-applied regulation of abatement technologies or emissions levels. This 
argument is, however, underpinned by implicit assumptions about instrument imperfection. Under 
conditions of full information, costless implementation and certainty, an equivalent first-best outcome 
can be achieved by either command-and-control regulation, or a market mechanism. 
 
Information costs and asymmetries are central to the instrument choice debate. Regulated firms may 
know much more about the costs of changing pollution than the regulator, but will also have 
incentives not to reveal this information. C&C regulation may be compelled to treat firms the same 
when in fact they differ, while market mechanisms allow for differential responses. 
 
Costs of information and monitoring also underlie the choice between various different forms that 
regulation can take. Compliance with bans, or with regulations mandating the installation of particular 
technologies, may be relatively cheap to monitor, which may account for much of the prevalence of 
these inflexible forms of regulation. Likewise, the operating costs of market mechanisms such as 
  2emissions taxes may influence the choice, and the design, of such instruments.  Often it may be 
cheaper to tax emission proxies (such as the use of a particular input) than to tax measured emissions. 
 
The upshot is that, in practice, the range of policy options available typically comprises a set of 
instruments characterised by various practical compromises. None of the available instruments is 
alone capable of implementing the first-best.  We may want to ask which instrument gets closer to the 
first-best. But if both are sufficiently imperfect, we may also be interested in the properties of 
instrument combinations, in which two instruments are used to offset each others’ weaknesses. 
 
The literature on the economics of instrument combinations is much more limited than that on 
either/or instrument choice.  Eskeland (1994) considers how an excise tax and regulation could be 
combined to mimic an otherwise-impracticable vehicle emissions fee. Innes (1996) models the effect 
on motor vehicle emissions of a wider range of instrument combinations. Hoel (1997) observes that 
the complexity of environmental problems, and the limitations of instrument design, typically mean 
that efficient regulation of road transport requires tax instruments to be combined with various other 
forms of regulation. Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) consider multi-part instruments, in which, 
typically, taxes and subsidies are combined to achieve an outcome closer to the first-best than either 
could alone. 
 
A parallel discussion concerns the relative merits of regulation by prices and by quantities. Weitzman 
(1974) showed that when there is uncertainty about the costs of pollution abatement the outcomes 
from regulation which sets a pollution price will differ from regulation which fixes the pollution 
quantity; the conditions under which one is superior to the other depend on the sensitivity of marginal 
abatement costs and marginal pollution damage to the emissions level.  A case for combining elements 
of both approaches is made by Roberts and Spence (1976), who show that quantity regulation with 
upper and lower price “safety valves” can eliminate the extreme outcomes associated with pure price 
or quantity regulation. In a similar vein, Mandell (2004) has argued that when there is abatement cost 
uncertainty regulating some sectors by price and others by quantity may be preferable to uniform 
application of one or other approach to the whole economy. 
 
In this paper we seek to characterise the circumstances in which combinations of tax and regulation 
may be required for efficient correction of some simple externality problems under conditions of 
certainty. The cases we consider all take the form of consumption externalities generated by individual 
consumption behaviour (although much of the underlying logic would also apply to externalities from 
production activities). We also basically confine our attention to situations where the purpose of 
taxation is to correct the externality; this allows us to abstract from the differences between taxes and 
  3direct regulation that reflect the value of the tax contribution to government revenues (the "double 
dividend" issue).  
 
Our point of departure is the same as the literature on imperfect externality-correcting taxes (Sandmo, 
1976, Green and Sheshinski, 1976), namely that the tax instruments available are somehow imperfect 
or inadequate. We consider situations where the available tax instruments can be supplemented with 
some form of direct regulation which is, likewise, imperfect, and therefore incapable alone of 
implementing the first-best. 
  
Following this introduction, the paper is in three main sections. In Section II we discuss the nature of 
the instrument imperfections which underpin the case for combined use of both tax and regulation. In 
Section III we consider cases where the tax instrument is incapable of differentiating efficiently 
between activities generating different levels of externality. For example, the tax on motor fuel cannot 
differentiate between fuel used to drive in congested road-space and fuel used for journeys which do 
not add to traffic congestion. We analyse the effect of combining direct regulation with the imperfect 
externality tax, and consider how direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax. In Section IV we 
then address an alternative source of imperfection, where the externality tax cannot be applied to all 
sources of the externality - for example, because some of the externality-generating goods can be 
purchased on the black market or imported without paying domestic tax. Again we consider the 
implications of adding direct regulation to the instrument mix. Section V briefly draws attention to 
some further issues largely neglected in the previous parts. Section VI draws some conclusions 
 
 
II. Imperfections in Taxes and Regulation 
 
In considering tax and regulation combinations we are interested in cases where both instruments 
depart from the ideal in some respect. In this section we describe, in turn, the various forms of 
instrument imperfection that may affect externality taxes and direct regulation, identifying some cases 
which we then model in subsequent sections. 
 
The existing literature on imperfect externality-correcting taxes has observed that most of the available 
tax instruments are based on a proxy for the externality, such as the sale of a good, rather than the 
externality itself (Sandmo, 1976; Green and Sheshinski, 1976). To the extent that the tax base is not a 
perfect proxy for the externality, externality taxes involve inefficiency, arising from the imperfect 
targeting of the incentive.  
 
  4To explore this idea further we could distinguish between three forms of externality tax. Taxes may be 
imposed on 
 
(1)  the measured externality 
  eg a congestion charge levied per km travelled at the marginal congestion externality 
 
(2)  consumption of a good which generates the externality 
  eg a tax on motor fuel, set at a level to reflect the marginal congestion externality 
 
(3)  consumption of goods which are related to the externality-creating good 
  eg a tax on urban parking spaces, or a subsidy (negative tax) to public transport. 
 
In analysing the use of commodity taxes to correct externalities, Green and Sheshinski (1976), Balcer 
(1980) and Wijkander (1985) refer to case (2) as a "direct" externality tax and case (3) as an "indirect" 
externality tax. The precise distinction being drawn is not always clear, and may amount to no more 
than that between a close proxy for the externality and weaker proxies. A sharper distinction could be 
drawn between a good which always generates the externality when consumed, and other goods which 
may be complements to or substitutes for consumption of this good. 
 
A tax on measured emissions could, in principle, achieve the first-best if levied at the marginal 
external cost of each unit of emissions. But direct measurement of emissions and unit charging for the 
externality may be technically infeasible or excessively costly, and measured-emissions taxes are rare 
in practice. Even those which do exist may not be optimally-differentiated to reflect the precise 
marginal external cost associated with each unit of emissions. 
 
Where the tax is not based directly on emissions or a perfect emissions proxy, there will tend to be 
inefficiency in the pattern of behavioural responses. Polluters will economise on use of the taxed 
commodity, but do not directly face an incentive to cut emissions. Costs may be incurred in reducing 
consumption in ways which do not reduce emissions. Likewise, possibilities for reducing emissions 
without reducing consumption will be ignored. In particular, there will be no incentive to use 
abatement technologies to alter the link between the taxed commodity and emissions. If we use the 
term “abatement” rather narrowly to refer to the use of such technologies, we can see that the 
inefficiency of taxes based on an emissions proxy rather than directly on emissions will consist in the 
fact that the first-best emissions tax leads to “consumption” and “abatement” responses, while the 
proxy encourages “consumption” responses alone. 
 
  5Externality taxes levied on goods will typically differ from the first-best externality tax for one of 
three main reasons: 
 
•  It will frequently be much less costly to make use of existing tax bases (eg sales taxes or 
VAT) than to introduce wholly-new externality taxes. However, existing taxes are typically 
based on the value of sales, and this may be a poorer proxy for external costs than would be a 
separate excise tax on the quantity sold.  
 
•  Even where externality taxation can take the form of an excise tax on physical quantities of 
the good, and the design of the tax is unconstrained by the need for compatibility with existing 
tax arrangements, administrative costs may limit the extent to which the tax can be 
differentiated to reflect the level of externality associated with each use. Moderate levels of 
alcohol consumption may for example be fairly harmless while heavy drinking by some 
individuals generates large and progressively-increasing externalities. However, it may not be 
possible to identify those sales liable to generate large external costs, or to levy non-linear 
taxes on individual purchasers. A uniform tax may be employed, because an optimally-
differentiated tax would be excessively costly or infeasible. 
 
•  Some externality-generating consumption of a good may escape taxation because some 
sources of acquisition are not subject to domestic taxation. For example, goods may be 
directly imported by cross-border shoppers or purchased on an untaxed black market. The tax 
will then distort the choice between the taxed and untaxed sources of supply.  Where a large 
tax generates a large deadweight loss, combining a lower tax and a (costly) regulation may be 
preferable to relying solely on a tax.  
 
In brief, a tax can be imperfect because of imperfect targeting, insufficient differentiation or failure to 
avoid differentiation where it is not desirable. In each of these cases the question is whether there is a 
role for regulation supplementing a tax.  
 
Regulations can be of many different kinds. Common examples in environmental policy are fixed 
quantitative limits on emissions or the mandatory use of abatement technologies.  Regulating 
externalities generated by consumption typically uses rather different instruments, including various 
restrictions on sale or consumption. In many cases, consumption regulation can be interpreted as 
increasing the real cost of acquisition, or reducing the quality of the commodity consumed. Regulation 
restricts alcohol consumption by restricting the outlets where it can be sold and by limiting opening 
hours, adding inconvenience costs to the cost of consumer purchases. The utility derived from 
consumption may be reduced by restrictions on where and when goods can be consumed, in a way 
  6similar to a reduction in quality. Thus, for example, restrictions on smoking in offices and restaurants 
mean that cigarettes have to be consumed outside, and road traffic restrictions on driving in specific 
areas or at certain times reduce the convenience of car travel. 
 
We can, in addition, draw a distinction between two types of consumption regulation, differing in how 
the impact on the externality arises. The first form of regulation works solely by reducing utility from 
each unit of the good consumed. The impact on the externality arises through the effect on the level of 
consumption alone – much the same response as would be achieved by using a consumption tax as an 
emissions proxy. The second form of regulation mandates the use of “abatement – in other words, 
requires consumers to bear an additional cost when consuming the good, that has the effect of 
reducing the externality from the units consumed. Typically regulation of this sort will have responses 
of two kinds – both “abatement” and “consumption” responses as discussed above. The scale of the 
consumption response relative to the abatement response will depend on the cost of abatement, and its 
relationship to the number of units consumed. This could in principle have various functional forms – 
a fixed cost per consumer, a constant cost per unit consumed, or more complex relationships. 
 
Imperfection in taxation is in a fundamental sense the justification for using regulation at all. One 
might think that if we can observe something sufficiently accurately to regulate it then we could tax it. 
If we can ban the sale of alcohol at particular times of the day, then we can, in principle, levy a tax on 
any such sales sufficient to reflect the externality involved, and this would appear to offer everything 
that the regulation can, with the added benefit of cost-reducing flexibility. In our view, the case for 
using regulation at all rests on the costs or impracticality of operating first-best externality taxes. 
While regulation might always be dominated by a theoretical first-best tax, the practically-available 
tax instruments may have inadequacies that make regulation preferable. Two issues, in particular, 
seem to be important. 
•  One is that externalities may often be non-linear in consumption, in various ways, and poorly 
approximated by uniform taxes on consumption. Thus, for example, requiring bars to close at 
a particular hour may limit public drunkenness, and while an increasing tax on each drink 
purchased - or even higher taxes on all drinks sold late at night - might in theory be able to 
achieve the same outcome with greater flexibility, neither could be implemented by modifying 
current excises, which tax alcoholic drinks well before the retail stage. Regulation may be 
better than a higher alcohol excise, even though neither is ideal. Time-of-day or purchaser-
specific alcohol taxes would require much more complex administration, and would be 
exposed to various forms of avoidance, including resale, which could be hard to prevent. 
Restrictions increasing the real cost of acquiring the good may barely affect consumers who 
make small and infrequent purchases but have a substantial impact on large consumers and 
thus mimic a non-linear tax.  
  7•  The second attraction of regulation is that frequently a prohibition on some activity may be 
much cheaper to monitor and enforce than any other limit. Zero activity can be more readily 
monitored than any other level, in the sense that any activity demonstrates non-compliance. 
Enforcing any other limit than zero would typically require more complex investigation and 
record-keeping. 
 
Nevertheless, the distinction between regulations and the use of taxes or other market-based 
instruments is not always clear-cut. A strict regulation may be imposed by making the installation of a 
certain abatement technology mandatory. A similar but less rigid policy would be to let installation be 
voluntary but to impose a tax on those who do not opt for the abatement technology. The advantage 
would be that the technology would not be adopted in cases where it is overly costly and socially 
undesirable but where the regulator would have sparse knowledge about costs. While the tax approach 
may appear to be the more efficient alternative it will also be more costly as, beyond monitoring the 
technology, one will have to determine the tax liability and collect taxes in each case while the 
regulation alternative will only require action to impose sanctions in the - conceivably few - instances 
of non-compliance.  
 
 
 III. Imperfect Differentiation  
 
As discussed above, an ideal tax is one that taxes the externality directly according to the marginal 
external cost. Where the external cost is determined solely by consumption the amount consumed 
would be a perfect proxy for the externality, and a commodity tax would achieve the same allocation 
as an externality tax. However, total consumption may be a too crude measure. One may need to 
distinguish between consumption at different times, in different locations, by different people, and in 
various other circumstances as the external cost may vary according to all these characteristics. This 
section addresses the case where the tax cannot be differentiated according to this kind of variation.  
 
Let a single consumer represent a homogeneous population. There are two consumption goods. 
Denote quantities by c and x. The latter good can be consumed in two different activities labelled 1 
and 2, respectively (which may also be interpreted as locations or time periods). The quantities 
1 x  and 





1 we can 
express the utility of a consumer in the absence of regulation as  
                                                 
1 Assuming quasi-linearity is an innocuous assumption as, roughly speaking, substitution effects will prevail in 
optimal tax formulas as income effects tend to cancel out where tax revenue is returned to the tax payers via 
transfers.   
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where the following properties are assumed:   , 
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The consumer is assumed to have a fixed income or endowment w. The cost of producing a unit of 
xis   which in a competitive market equilibrium equals the producer price. Let us assume that two 
externality-correcting instruments are available. One is a (uniform) tax on x, denoted t. The other is a 
regulation of activity 1. The regulation, represented by a parameter r, reduces the utility derived 
from
p
1 x , which we now write as
1 (, ) f xr. The underlying assumption is that the nature of the 
regulation is to degrade the circumstances in which the good is acquired or consumed. We assume that 
 and   which means that tightening regulation will depress total as well as 
marginal utility of consuming the good in question. We may note that an abatement requirement 
would have the same effect to the extent that the loss of utility is incurred because the consumer is 
forced to spend resources on abatement but abatement would also have the further effect that it would 
diminish emissions for given consumption so there would be a shift in  . We return to this issue 
in Section 5.  
'1
2(, )0 fxr <
'' 1




We can write the budget constraint of the consumer as  
12 () ( wT c ptx x +=+ + +)                                                                                                                  (2) 
where T is a lump-sum transfer used to recycle any government revenue to the consumer 
so that  . 
12 () Tt xx =+
Allowing for regulation, we can write the utility function as  
V=c+
1 (, ) f xr+   .                                                                                            (3) 
2 () gx 1
1 () ex − 2
2 () ex −
The representative consumer, being a “small” agent in the market, maximises utility subject to the 
budget constraint, treating the externalities, the price and the government instruments as exogenous. 
The following first order conditions obtain  
'1
1(, ) f xr pt =+                                                                                                                                     (4)  
2 '( ) gx pt =+                                                                                                                                        (5) 
implying the demand functions  
1(, ) x pt r + and
2() x pt + .                                                                                                                     (6) 
 
  9Simple comparative statics yield the effects of the instruments on the consumer’s demand. It is 





















For a change in r, a stricter regulation, we find  
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Allowing for the government instruments and making use of (2) and (3), we can express the 
consumer’s utility as  
12 1 1 2 2
12 ( ( , ), ) ( ( )) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ) ( ( )) V fxpt rr g xpt wp xpt r expt r p xpt expt =+ ++ + − + −+ − + −+
                                                                                                                                                                (8) 
 
Let us begin by considering the optimal tax and regulation in this framework. Suppose that initially 
welfare is maximised with respect to the tax rate implying the first order condition 
 
'1 2 ' 1 ' 2
11 '( )( ) tpp p Vf xg x p e x p e x =+− +− + =0                                                                                   (9) 
 
and the second order condition  
0 tt V <                                                                                                                                                   (10) 
where single and double subscripts are used to denote first and second derivatives, respectively. 
Invoking the first order conditions of the consumer’s maximisation, we can write the first order 
condition for t as 
 
12 ' 1 ' 2
12 (, ) () (, ) ( pp p p t xpt r t xpt e xpt r e xpt ++ + − +− + =0                                                                (11)  
 
from which we get the formula  
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                                                                                                          (12) 
 
(12) is of the same form as  the well-known weighted average formula of Diamond (1973) 
characterising the optimal uniform tax rate on activities that generate non-uniform external costs in the 
absence of regulation. Thus we have demonstrated that the weighted average formula for the tax holds 
also in this model where regulation is also present, but we note that  regulation will normally change 
the weights. 
 
Turning to regulation and differentiating welfare with respect to the regulation parameter we obtain  
'1 ' ' 1 ' 1 '
12 1 1 () ( ) rr r r Vf xf p e xt e xf =+ − + = −+ 2                                                                                      (13) 
where the latter equation is due to (4) 
 
Starting out from an unregulated situation, (stricter) regulation will be worthwhile if the sign of (13) is 
positive. For this to happen the marginal external cost of good 1,  , must exceed the tax rate, t, and 




2 f − , must not be too large. Since the tax rate is a weighted 
average of the marginal social costs of the two goods the good that should be regulated is the one with 
the larger marginal social cost.  
 
Consider now how tighter regulation will affect the tax rate. Starting out from the first order condition, 
standard comparative statics yields  
 
1 '
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Making use of the condition 
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, and accordingly 
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1 0 et −> 0 tt V <
1 0 r x <
1 0 p x < . Accordingly, the former term on the right hand side 
has the sign of 




. The partial effect of a steeper demand schedule is to decrease the tax rate. As 
we see from (12), the larger marginal external cost is then given less weight in the tax formula. Effects 
are opposite where regulation makes the demand curve flatter. Where the demand causing the more 
serious externality becomes more (less) price responsive the tax obviously becomes a more (less) 
efficient instrument for diminishing the externality. The latter term on the right hand side is strictly 
negative where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption. This is natural as stricter 
regulation will discourage consumption and lower the marginal external cost and accordingly the 
externality-correcting tax.   
 
We can sum up our results so far.  
 
Proposition 1  
  Where a Pigouvian tax is supplemented by regulation it is the consumption causing the larger 
marginal external cost that should be regulated.   
  Where  marginal external costs and the price responsiveness of demand schedules are 
constant tighter regulation leaves the tax rate unchanged.  
  Where the marginal external effect is increasing (non-decreasing) in consumption and 
regulation makes demand no more (less) price responsive the effect of stricter regulation is to lower 
the tax rate. 
  Where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption and regulation makes demand 
more price responsive there are ambiguous effects on the tax rate. 
 
In general, regulations can be of many types and it is hard to impose further restrictions on the f-
function. However, it may be helpful to consider special cases. Assume first that 
11 (, ) ()
1 f xr h x r x =− .                                                                                                                        (16) 
 
'1 1
1(, ) ' () f xr hx r pt =− = +                                                                                                              (17) 
 
1 '( ) hx p t r =+ +                                                                                                                                 (18) 
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The characteristic of this case is that regulation has the same effect on demand as the price. We can 
conceive of a number of cases where this may be a plausible description. Suppose the regulation 
requires spending real resources in addition to the monetary expenses in order to acquire or consume 
the good. Then the cost of each unit of consumption will increase. Suppose the regulation is to lower 
speed limits on a road. Then the cost of travelling will increase in terms of time.  
 
A common assumption in demand analysis is that h’’’ and  . 0 >
1 0 pp x >
2 In this case a price increase 
and a stricter regulation will both make the demand schedule steeper and reduce the price 
responsiveness. Alternatively, a linear demand schedule is often considered where the slope of the 
demand schedule is constant.  
 
Other specifications may treat the regulation as reducing the quality of the good. Conceivable 
specifications are 
11 (, ) (/ ) f xr h x r =  or  ( )
1 (, ) ( 1 )
1 f xr h r x =− . In these cases the assumption that 
h’’’>0 implies that r will have ambiguous effects on the slope of the demand schedule.  
 
Now consider the full optimum where both the tax rate and the regulation have been optimised so that   
 
'1 2 ' 1 ' 2
11 '( )( ) tpp p Vf xg x p e x p e x =+− +− + 2 p
0
2 0
                                                
=0                                                                                 (22) 
 
'1 ' ' 1
12 1 () rr r Vf xf p e x =+ − + =                                                                                                          (23) 
 
Owing to  (4) 
 
'1 '
1 () (, ) r et x p t r f −− + +=                                                                                                              (24) 
 
 
2 This might be suggested by the analogy with the expected utility function and the property of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion.  
  13implying that  . Alternatively, we can write 
'
1 0 et −>
 
'1 ' =0                                                                                                               (25)  12 () ( , ) r ee x p t r f −− + +
 
where  e is the weighted average in (12). It is important to note that 
'
1 ete = <  which confirms that 
regulation will be applied to the activity with the larger externality.  
 
By standard comparative statics we can examine how the policy mix depends on the external effect. 
Consider now the case where marginal external costs are constant: 
11
1() ex x
1 ε =  where 
1 ε  is a 
parameter. Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to  1 ε  and denoting derivatives by 
means of a prime we find  
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To simplify, let us assume that third derivatives of f and g are zero and accordingly 
1
p x  and 
1
r x  are 
constant. Since 
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since by second order conditions  and  0 tt V < 0 rr V < .  
 
The tax rate is larger, and the optimal regulation is tighter the larger is the more serious externality. In 
a similar way we find by differentiating w.r.t.  2 ε  that the tax rate will increase and the regulation is 
left unchanged in response to an increase in  2 ε . 
 
If instead we assume that the marginal external cost is increasing and there is a constant positive shift 
in the marginal external cost generated by  1 x  regulation will become tighter while there are 
  14ambiguous effects on the tax rate. On the one hand the shift in the externality is an argument for a 
larger tax, but as the tighter regulation depresses the marginal external cost the net effect is 
indeterminate.   
 
So far we have assumed that the regulation does not affect the demand for the unregulated good 2. Let 
us now consider the case of cross-effects so that a stricter regulation will shift some demand from 
good 1 to good 2. The utility function can be written  
U=c+   .                                                                                                 (30) 





In general it is hard to know how the slopes of demand schedules will change and hence how the 
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where  and   are the weights defined by the latter equation.         1 w 2 w
 
Cross effects on demand will imply that
1 0 r x < ,  , and plausibly the former change is larger in 
absolute  value than the latter. (The reduced consumption in market 1 is not fully offset by increased 
consumption in market 2.) 
2 0 r x >
 
'' 1 '' 2





r                                                                                                                         (32) 
  
The change in the tax rate will depend on the extent to which reduced demand for good 1 generates 
increased demand for good 2, on the weights, and on the changes in the marginal external costs. 
Circumstances that are conducive to a larger tax rate are that the marginal external cost curve of good 
2 is steeper than that of good 1, cross effects on demand are strong, and the weight of good 2 is large.  
 
If regulating smoking in public places diverts smoking to other places and strongly drives up the 
marginal external cost there a larger tax is needed to reflect the larger external cost in the unregulated 
place. However, if the other place is not much affected or the regulation even induces people to give 
up smoking altogether the optimal tax will be lowered.  
 
Beyond cross effects on demand, there may be cross effects on the external costs where the marginal 
cost is not constant. There may not only be an external cost from each activity but there may also be 
external costs which depend on the total consumption. The combination of a general external cost and 
activity specific externalities might be expressed as e(
1 x  + 





  15smoking may not only impose passive smoking on others at various times and places but there may be 
external costs owing to health effects which are related to the smoking record of a person 
independently of the circumstances in which the smoking took place. If there is no shifting of 
consumption from one activity to the other a restriction lowering consumption in one activity will then 
lower the marginal external cost in both activities and there is a case for lowering the tax. If there is 
some but less than fully offsetting increase in consumption in the other activity there will be opposing 
effects. The marginal “general” externality will decline but the other activity-specific externality, if 
present, will increase at the margin. Where restrictions on smoking in public induce people to smoke 
less altogether but more at home where there is no specific externality there is a case for lowering the 
tax.  
 
A ban on an activity.  
A “soft” regulation of the type above is not always feasible. One might like to directly restrict the 
consumption of a good in a particular place, say restricting the amount of smoking, drinking, 
motorised traffic, burning coal, etc. One might like everybody to cut down consumption by thirty or 
fifty percent to alleviate the externality, but this restriction is hard to enforce where the level of 
consumption cannot be exactly monitored. The only regulation that can be enforced may be a ban, as 
the regulator will then only need to observe that somebody is consuming the good in order to know 
that the regulation is being violated. Subject to this constraint the cost benefit problem is whether 
cutting back the externality outweighs the loss of consumer’s surplus inflicted by the ban (and the cost 
of the regulator). Suppose a ban on activity i is socially desirable. Then activity i will be abandoned 
and the tax is determined by equating it to the marginal external cost of activity j (where j i ≠ ). A ban 
will raise or lower the tax depending on which activity that is being banned. This is not obvious. Even 
if activity A causes the larger externality per unit, we don’t know in which activity the external cost 
exceeds the consumer’s surplus. (We suppose that this does not happen in both activities, which would 
justify banning the good altogether.) Thus even if a “soft” regulation will always be targeted at the 
activity with the larger marginal external cost, this need not be the case with a ban (even if we imagine 
it will often be the case).  
 
IV. Unwanted Differentiation – Tax Avoidance by Cross-border Shopping   
 
Sometimes there may be cases in which uniform taxation is difficult to implement, even when 
desirable, because the tax may be avoided in parts of the market. To fix ideas we shall consider a 
regime where the domestic tax may be avoided by purchasing the good in question abroad, but the 
example may be interpreted as representing more general cases. The important feature of the analysis 
is that the tax can be avoided at a real resource cost. In this sense our analysis is akin to the literature 
  16on risk-free but costly tax avoidance
3. While cross-border shopping is chosen as a specific example it 
is also a case of major importance in many countries where consumers go abroad (or to other states in 
the US) to buy goods many of which are supposed to generate externalities (alcohol, tobacco, petrol).  
 
Suppose that an amount x of a good is purchased at home at a price p+t and an amount z is purchased 
abroad at a retail price q and a (travel, etc.) cost k(z), where k’>0, k’’>0. The budget constraint is  
() ( wT c pt xq zk z +=+ + + + )
)
                                                                                                (33)    
where w is an exogenous income, and T is a lump-sum transfer used to return any government revenue 
to the consumer and perceived as exogenous by the consumer. Hence, T=tx.  
 
As before, our notion of regulation is that it imposes a real cost of consuming the externality-
generating good. The utility function of a representative agent is  
U=c+ (, f xz r +  =  () ( ) wT pt xq zk z −+ −− (, ) + f xz r + +                                                 (34) 
The benefit derived from consuming x+z  is increasing in consumption and decreasing in regulation 
and the marginal benefit is assumed to be decreasing in consumption and in strictness of regulation, r. 
In mathematical terms 
'
1 f >0, 
'
2 f <0, 
'
11 0 f < , 
''
12 0 f < . 
 
The first order conditions of the consumer’s maximisation are 
 
'
1 f (x+z,r)=q+k’(z)                                                                                                                               (35) 
 
'
1 f (x+z,r)=p+t                                                                                                                                     (36) 
 
It follows from (35) and (36) that                                                                           
q+k’(z)= p+t                                                                                                                                        (37)  
and  
z=z(p+t-q),                                                                                                              (38)        /1 / ' ' zt k ∂∂ = > 0








<0                                                                                                                                (39) 
                                                 
3 The idea is that by incurring a real resource cost, which is increasing in the amount of evasion/avoidance, a 










<0                                                                                                                              
(40) 
The total consumption x+z generates an externality expressed by the the external cost function e(x+z). 
Allowing for the externality, and recalling that T=tx, social utility is  
 
() wp xq zk z −−− + (, ) f xz r +−
)
e(x+z)=v(t,r)                                                                                (41) 
where the indirect utility function v(t,r) is due to the fact that x and z are functions of t and r from (35) 
and (36).  Maximising v(t,r) w.r.t. the tax, we get the first order condition 
 
/ t vtv ∂∂ ==  ( + p −
'
1(, f xz r + -e’) / x t ∂∂ +(-q-k’ +
'
1(, ) f xz r + -e’) / z t ∂ ∂ =0                              (42) 
Making use of the first order conditions of the consumer we can simplify to obtain  
 
(' ) / t v text =−∂∂ '/ ez t −∂∂ =0                                                                                                          (43) 
 
which we can reformulate as  
 
(' )( ) / et xz t −− ∂+ ∂ / tz t −∂ ∂=0.                                                                                                       (44) 
 
Since  and  / zt ∂∂ > 0 0 () / x zt ∂+ ∂ < the immediate implication is that t<e’. We can interpret  e’ – t  
as the un-internalised part of the cost of consuming the good. Where the externality is only partially 
internalised (t<e’) a tax discouragement of consumption will enhance welfare as reflected by the 
former term on the left hand side which we interpret as the marginal benefit of depressing 
consumption. The latter term on the left hand side is the distortion due to the cross-border shopping 
generated by the tax wedge, and we can interpret  / tz t ∂ ∂ as a marginal social cost of reducing x+z by 
means of the tax.  
 











                                                                                                                          (45) 
 
Consider now the marginal effect on social utility of using the regulation, when a tax is already in 
place.  
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'
2 /( ' ) ( ) / ( r vrv et xz rf xz r ∂∂ = = −− ∂+ ∂ + + , )
)
                                                                             (46)   
 
Similar to the discussion above, we can interpret the former term on the right hand side as the 
marginal benefit and 
'
2(, f xz r −+as the marginal cost of the regulatory policy.  
 











                                                                                                                           (47) 
   
Taking an arbitrary point of departure, the more efficient instrument at the margin is the one with the 
smaller marginal cost as defined above. Where regulation always inflicts a real resource cost on 
society, 
'
2(, ) f xz r + <0 for all feasible values of r, and we can conclude that if taxation is not 
used 0 tr MCM =<C . It follows immediately that it will never be optimal to rely solely on regulation. 
The explanation is simple. A small (infinitesimal) tax will imply a negligible distortion while even a 
small regulation will inflict a finite real cost on society. A conceivable caveat is that the introduction 
of a tax may involve an administrative cost so that a “small” tax is not costless. Such a cost might 
deprive the tax of its edge over regulation but only if adopting the regulation is less costly in terms of 
administration.   
 
A further implication is that at a very low level of government intervention, the externality-alleviating 
policy will rely solely on taxation. Indeed this would be the case where the externality itself is minor.  
 
Proposition 2 
Where a tax and a costly regulation may coexist it will never be optimal to rely solely on regulation. 
At a sufficiently modest level of intervention the tax is the only instrument deployed at the optimum.  
 
Where there is a major externality, calling for extensive intervention, it is likely to be efficient to 
deploy both instruments. The optimality condition will require tr MCM C = .  
 
Where t is ”large” any change in t will take place from a distorted point of departure and there is 
conceivably a sizeable marginal cost associated with using the tax alone to mitigate the externality. 
The tax imperfection due to partial enforcement implies that it is not only the regulation that entails a 
real cost. We note that where the tax (and price) response of cross-border shopping is (close to) 
constant the numerator of (45) is obviously increasing in t. If the demand schedule becomes steeper as 
  19demand declines with increasing price this effect is being reinforced. (We discuss these properties 
further below.) Unless the marginal cost of regulation is overly large, gradually increasing the tax will 
take us to a point where the marginal cost of taxation no longer falls short of the marginal cost of 
regulation, and efficiency requires that the regulation kicks in.  
 
A further question is how one would like to combine the two instruments for diminishing consumption 
beyond the level where regulation is adopted. The combination will then be determined by two 
conditions: t and r should be chosen such that the desirable amount of consumption (x+z) is achieved 
and marginal costs (defined by (45) and (47)) should be equated. How marginal cost curves are 
affected by changes in r ant t will then be crucial for the optimal mix. Where both marginal costs 
increase as a stricter policy is applied both instruments will be used more intensively but other cases 
are conceivable. Assume that  r MC  is constant while  t MC is increasing in t but is unaffected by r. 
Then any further reduction in consumption beyond the point where r is introduced will be achieved by 
increasing r and keeping t unchanged. Otherwise t MC  would be pushed above r MC . Where  r MC  is 
constant but the effects of both t and r are to increase  t MC  the r-instrument will be used to depress 
consumption beyond the threshold where regulation kicks in while the use of t will be scaled down as 
stricter regulation is imposed.  
 
Consider now the case where initially the tax is the only instrument in use. We may then ask how 
introducing regulation will affect the tax-setting. Note that the difference from the paragraph above is 
that the consumption level is set optimally conditional on the available tax instruments. Where the tax 
is used optimally we know from (43) that  
(' ) / t v text =−∂∂ '/ ez t −∂∂ =0              
and the corresponding second order condition is  0 tt v < . We note from (37) that z is independent of r. 
Differentiating wrt r we get       
(' ) / ' ' () () tt
dt
v te xte xz xz
dr r r t
∂∂ ∂
+− ∂∂ − + + =
∂∂ ∂
0 .                                                             (48) 
The expression consists of three main terms. Due to the second order condition  . We have 
observed that t-e’<0.  





∂∂ may have either sign.  , and the last term (including the minus 
sign) is zero or negative. We note that   is conducive to making  dt/dr negative. The 
interpretation is straightforward. Tighter regulation will diminish the emission and lower the marginal 
external cost implying that there is less need for the externality tax.  When regulation is tightened 
'' 0 e ≥
'' 0 e >




−∂ ∂ < > 0 is conducive to making dt/dr <(>)0 . It follows that where   dt/dr <0 if  '' 0 e =








0 −∂∂>. The crucial factor is whether regulation 
makes domestic demand more or less price responsive. To simplify further consider the case where 
/ z t ∂∂ is constant (corresponding to a quadratic cost function k(z), which is in fact a common 
assumption in the literature on cross-border shopping). Then 
(/ )( ( ) / dx td x zt
dr dr
) −∂∂ − ∂+ ∂
= . Where 
consumption becomes less sensitive to a price increase when there is stricter regulation the tax is used 
to a lesser extent when stricter regulation is imposed. It is commonplace to draw the demand schedule 
so that a price change has a smaller impact on demand at lower levels of consumption. If a regulation-
induced decline in demand has the same effect we would have a case for a lower tax. In general we 
cannot rule out the opposite case. Where there is a linear demand schedule ( () / x zt ∂ +∂ is constant) 
regulation will have no impact on the optimal tax unless e’’>0.     
 
Proposition 3  
Let the tax be the only instrument optimally in use.  Then introducing a marginal regulation has the 
following partial effects:  
i.  a lower (higher) tax where regulation makes domestic demand less (more) sensitive to a tax 
increase,  
ii.  a lower  tax where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption.  
 
Where demand is more sensitive to price the tax becomes a more efficient instrument for diminishing 
the quantity consumed and the associated externality. The externality can then be depressed more 
without creating a larger tax wedge between sources of supply.  
 
 
V. Some Further Issues 
 
So far in this paper we have confined our attention to cases where the sole objective of policy is the 
efficient control of an externality. Where the tax raises revenues these have no social value, and can be 
returned to individuals in lump-sum payments. The extensive "double dividend" literature
4 has, 
however, emphasised the value of the revenues derived from externality taxes, which can reduce the 
need for revenues from other tax instruments. Externality taxes may then be set with two objectives in 
mind - both alleviating externality distortions, and contributing to efficient revenue-raising. How far 
does the recognition of this second objective affect the optimal policy mix of imperfect tax and 
imperfect regulation? 
                                                 
4 See Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for an overview 
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For considering these issues a natural starting point is the literature on the role of commodity taxes in 
an efficient revenue system. It is well known from the literature that where a distortionary income tax 
is used to raise revenue, a commodity tax (or commodity subsidy) may in some circumstances enhance 
welfare by alleviating the distortions associated with the income tax
5. Where differential taxation of 
people with different, but unobservable, earnings capacity is desirable for distributional reasons the 
income tax must be designed subject to the self-selection constraint that the more productive agents do 
not mimic the less able, and distortions are mitigated by softening this constraint. The alleviation 
naturally comes at a cost since differential commodity taxation distorts the choice of consumption 
bundle. A number of papers
6 have discussed this issue making various assumptions about the income 
tax, and have shown that assumptions about the structure of consumer preferences are crucial for the 
use of commodity taxes to enhance the efficiency of revenue-raising.  The key issue is the relationship 
between commodity demands and labour supply. Where these interact, then, roughly-speaking, 
commodities that are related to leisure should be taxed at high rates while work-related commodities 
should be taxed less (or subsidised) in order to mitigate labour supply distortions. These policy rules 
may, however, need to be adjusted once the role of some commodities in generating externalities is 
recognised
7. Pirtillä and Tuomala (1997) show that, where environmental quality and leisure are 
complements, a deterioration in environmental quality can alleviate the self-selection constraint on 
income taxation, suggesting that the externality tax might then be set lower than would be optimal in 
the absence of revenue-raising and distributional considerations. 
 
This strand of literature confines its attention to optimal tax analysis and does not consider the use of 
regulation. Since the objective of minimising the distortionary cost of revenue-raising prevents the 
commodity tax from being tailored perfectly to the Pigouvian objective of minimising external costs, it 
might seem that the addition of a further instrument in the form of regulation would ease the constraint 
on the attainment of both objectives. This may conceivably be the case with certain forms of 
regulation. But with the type of regulation considered above - which acts to increase the costs of 
obtaining each unit consumed - the additional instrument is not likely to be of help
8.  The reason is 
that it is the real choice of consumption bundle that matters. It is the encouragement or 
discouragement of the consumption of specific commodities that affects labour supply. Whether this is 
achieved by using taxes or regulation is immaterial to the impact on the self-selection constraint on 
                                                 
5 An important insight underpinning this literature is the observation that a commodity tax only adds to the fiscal 
possibilities offered by an income tax to the extent that it taxes goods at different rates; a uniform tax on all 
consumption is equivalent to a uniform tax on income. 
6 For instance Corlett and Hague (1953), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Christiansen (1984). 
7 Crawford et al (2009), in a paper for the Mirrlees Review, discuss which (positive or negative) commodities 
taxes that should supplement income taxes based also on empirical findings. The authors note that the "list of 
commodities includes some associated with pollution and other externalities, which might have implication for 
tax rates tempering those arising from the issues of preference structure addressed here”. 
8 We develop this formally in Christiansen and Smith (2008). 
  22income taxation, but there may be a difference in the cost of achieving the outcome. The main social 
cost of taxation is to distort the consumption bundle but regulation will do the same. Beyond these 
similar effects,  regulation is likely to impose a larger burden on consumers as it works by inflicting a 
loss of utility for any given consumption bundle as discussed above. It follows that this kind of 
regulation will be inferior to the tax instrument, and will achieve no reduction in the distortionary 
costs of income taxation.  
 
 
VI  Conclusions 
 
Information asymmetries and costs of administration may give rise to imperfections in both externality 
taxes and direct regulation. Used alone, neither instrument may be capable of achieving the most 
efficient reduction in external costs, and a more efficient outcome may be achieved by combined use 
of multiple instruments. This paper looks at the economic issues which arise when externality taxes 
and direct regulation are used in parallel. It explores the properties of two simple models of imperfect 
tax and imperfect regulation, reflecting different form of imperfection in the tax instrument. 
 
The focus of the paper is on externalities arising from individuals’ consumption decisions. A number 
of such externalities are affected by the kinds of instrument inefficiency we describe. Taxes on the sale 
of alcoholic drinks or tobacco products, for example, can only roughly approximate the externalities 
generated by their consumption. Likewise the available forms of regulation, such as the recent ban on 
smoking in public places in many European countries, are not precisely targeted to the underlying 
external costs. 
 
Regulation may affect consumption behaviour in a number of ways. We suggest that for a number of 
consumer externalities it may be useful to think of regulation as an increase in the cost to consumers of 
obtaining the good (for example, where the sale of alcoholic drinks is limited to a small number of 
outlets). Regulation thus has effects which are similar to - but not equivalent to - an increase in price. 
It will be seen that the representation of regulation here differs sharply from the emission limits or 
technology mandates typically considered when analysing the regulation of industrial emissions. 
 
Section 3 considered a case where an externality tax cannot be adequately differentiated to reflect 
differences in the external costs from different units consumed. Costs may differ between individuals, 
or between consumption in different contexts, and yet the tax is constrained to be uniform. We show 
that in this situation the outcome can be improved by direct regulation of consumption generating the 
larger external cost. The optimal externality tax rate in this context takes the same form as the well-
known weighted average formula of Diamond (1973). How it is affected by the addition of regulation 
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consumption. Where these are constant, tighter regulation has no effect on the optimal tax, but if the 
marginal external effect is increasing in consumption and if regulation does not increase the price-
responsiveness of demand for the regulated activity, adding regulation reduces the optimal externality 
tax rate. 
 
Section 4 considered a contrasting case where the tax exhibits undesirable differentiation - for example 
where some consumption escapes the externality tax, by being purchased in low-tax countries abroad 
or on the black market. Where this happens, an externality-motivated commodity tax will distort the 
choice between different sources of supply and the resulting excess burden will be increasing in the 
tax rate. We show that the optimal policy mix will depend on the scale of intervention required. Where 
there is a major externality it will, as before, be optimal to deploy both instruments, set at a level to 
equate the marginal cost per unit reduction in consumption from each instrument. However, although 
both instruments are imperfect, combined use will not always be optimal. We demonstrate that in 
cases where the externality is small, it will be efficient to control externality effects using the tax 
alone, and it will never be optimal to rely solely on regulation. The intuition for this result is 
straightforward: regulation always inflicts a finite real resource cost on society, while a small 
(infinitesimal) tax involves negligible distortion. 
 
We then consider the implications of introducing regulation, starting from a situation where the 
externality is controlled through the use of a tax alone. In this situation, the addition of regulation may 
raise or lower the optimal tax. As before, these effects will depend on how marginal external costs and 
the price responsiveness of demand vary with consumption. Adding regulation will reduce the optimal 
tax where regulation reduces the sensitivity of demand to the tax, and/or where the marginal external 
cost is increasing in consumption. 
 
Our models have in common that using the tax to internalise an externality is costly because it it is 
distortionary in some other respect. In the former model, increasing the tax to alleviate the more 
serious externality will over-internalise the weaker externality. In the latter model a larger tax will 
better internalise the externality but will increase the locational distortion. We note that in both models 
sensitivity of demand is crucial to the effect of tighter regulation on the optimal externality tax In the 
first model the tax is a more (less) efficient instrument for diminishing the externality where the 
demand causing the more serious externality becomes more (less) price sensitive in response to the 
regulation. In the second model more price responsive domestic demand makes the tax a more 
efficient instrument for diminishing the quantity consumed and the associated externality. With larger 
sensitivity the externality can be depressed more without creating a larger tax wedge between sources 
of supply. 




Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz J. E. (1976), The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect 
Taxation, Journal of Public Economics 6, 55-75. 
Balcer, Y., (1980), Taxation of Externalities: Direct versus Indirect, Journal of Public Economics 13, 
121-129. 
Boadway, R., Marchand M. and  Pestieau, P. (1994), Towards a Theory of the Direct-Indirect Tax 
Mix, Journal of Public Economics 55, 71-88.  
Bovenberg, A.L. and Goulder, L.H., (2002), Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in A. J. 
           Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, New York, 
            1471-1545. 
Christiansen, V. (1984), Which Commodity Taxes Should Supplement the Income Tax? Journal of 
Public Economic 24, 195-220. 
Christiansen V. and S. Smith (2009), Imperfect Externality-Correcting Taxes and Regulation when 
             Revenues Matter. Mimeo. 
Cnossen, S. (2005), Theory and Practice of Excise Taxation. Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, 
            and Driving, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Corlett, W. J. and Hague, D. C. (1953), Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation, Review 
of Economic Studies 21, 21–30. 
Crawford, I., Keen, M. and Smith, S. (2009), “Value Added Tax and Excises” in Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (ed) Dimensions of Tax Design. Background papers for the Mirrlees Review of the UK 
Tax System, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Diamond, P.A. (1973), Consumption Externalities with Imperfect Corrective Pricing, Bell Journal of 
Economics 4, 526-38. 
Eskeland, G.S. (1994), A Presumptive Pigouvian Tax: Complementing Regulation to Mimic an 
Emissions Fee, World Bank Economic Review 8, 373-94. 
Fullerton, D. and Wolverton, A. (1999), The Case for a Two-part instrument: Presumptive Tax and 
Environmental Subsidy, in A Panagariya, P.R. Portney and R. M. Schwab (eds), 
Environmental and Public Economics. Essays in Honor of Wallace E. Oates, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Green, J. and Sheshinski, E. (1976), Direct versus Indirect Remedies for Externalities. Journal of 
Political Economy 84, 797-808. 
Hoel, M., (1998), Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 100, 79-104. 
  25Hoel, M. (1997), International Coordination of Environmental Taxes, in C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco 
(eds.), New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge,105-146. 
  Innes, R. (1996), Regulating Automobile Pollution under Certainty, Competition and Imperfect 
Information. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31, 219-239. 
Mandell, S. (2004), Optimal Mix of Price and Quantity Regulation under Uncertainty. Stockholm 
University Research Papers in Economics, 204:12 
Pirttilä, J. and Tuomala M. (1997), Income  Tax, Commodity Tax and Environmental Policy 
International Tax and Public Finance 4, 379-393 
Roberts, M. J. and Spence, M. (1976), Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty", Journal of 
Public Economics 5, 193-208. 
Sandmo, A., (1976), Direct versus Indirect Pigovian Taxation. European Economic Review 7, 337-
349. 
Sandmo, A., (2000), The Public Economics of the Environment, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Weitzman, M. L. (1991), Prices vs. Quantities, Review of Economic Studies 41, 477-91.  
Wijkander, H., (1985), Correcting Externalities through Taxes on Subsidies to Related Goods, Journal 
of Public Economics 28, 111-125. 
  26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
 
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
  
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 
 
2748 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Apostolis Pavlou, Upstream Horizontal Mergers and 
Efficiency Gains, August 2009 
 
2749 Rüdiger Pethig and Christian Wittlich, Interaction of Carbon Reduction and Green 
Energy Promotion in a Small Fossil-Fuel Importing Economy, August 2009 
 
2750 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Monetary Policy 
Transmission and House Prices: European Cross-country Evidence, August 2009 
 
2751 Olaf Posch, Explaining Output Volatility: The Case of Taxation, August 2009 
 
2752 Beatrice Scheubel, Daniel Schunk and Joachim Winter, Don’t Raise the Retirement 
Age! An Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms and East-West Differences in 
Germany, August 2009 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009 
 
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
 
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009  
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009 
 
2773 Erdal Yalcin, Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export, 
August 2009 
 
2774 Klaus Abberger, Wolfgang Nierhaus and Shynar Shaikh, Findings of the Signal 
Approach for Financial Monitoring in Kazakhstan, September 2009 
 
2775 Sascha O. Becker, Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, The Trade-off 
between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition, 
September 2009 
 
2776 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy, September 2009 
 
2777 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax 
Economics, September 2009  
2778 Cagri Seda Kumru and Athanasios C. Thanopoulos, Social Security Reform and 
Temptation, September 2009 
 
2779 Alessandro Bucciol and Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Inter- and Intra-generational 
Consequences of Pension Buffer Policy under Demographic, Financial and Economic 
Shocks, September 2009 
 
2780 Eduardo Strube and Marcelo Resende, Complementarity of Innovation Policies in the 
Brazilian Industry: An Econometric Study, September 2009 
 
2781 Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe, “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In 
Search of the Right Mix in the Face of Climate Change, September 2009 
 
2782 Maria L. Loureiro, Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano and Daniela Vuri, Smoking Habits: Like 
Father, Like Son, Like Mother, Like Daughter, September 2009 
 
2783 Momi Dahan, Tehila Kogut and Moshe Shalem, Do Economic Policymakers Practice 
what they Preach? The Case of Pension Decisions, September 2009 
 
2784 Eytan Sheshinski, Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education, September 2009 
 
2785 Nannette Lindenberg and Frank Westermann, How Strong is the Case for Dollarization 
in Costa Rica? A Note on the Business Cycle Comovements with the United States, 
September 2009 
 
2786 Leif Danziger, Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on Hours and 
Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets, September 2009 
 
2787 Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber and Christian Traxler, Testing Enforcement 
Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information, September 
2009 
 
2788 Gabriel J. Felbermayr, Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Unemployment in an 
Interdependent World, September 2009 
 
2789 Sebastian G. Kessing, Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices, 
September 2009 
 
2790 Daniel Gros, Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes, September 2009 
 
2791 Louis N. Christofides, Michael Hoy and Ling Yang, The Gender Imbalance in 
Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005), September 2009 
 
2792 Jan K. Brueckner and Robert W. Helsley, Sprawl and Blight, September 2009 
 
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, 
September 2009 